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 This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from a 
District Court‟s order entered June 15, 2010, granting Chevron 
Corporation the opportunity to engage in discovery pursuant to 
its application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782.  Section 1782(a) 
provides in material part that “[t]he district court of the district 
in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his 
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing 
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal[.]”  
  4 
Section 1782(a), however, includes the limitation that “[a] 
person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement 
or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any 
legally applicable privilege.”  The District Court, following a 
hearing that consisted of arguments of counsel, found that it was 
appropriate for it to grant a portion of Chevron‟s section 1782 
application.  In reaching its result the Court rejected a privilege 
issue raised in the proceeding by appellants, the plaintiffs in an 
environmental damages action in Ecuador and a New Jersey 
environmental consulting firm, Uhl, Baron, Rana & Associates, 
Inc. (UBR), engaged by the plaintiffs in the Ecuadorian case as a 
non-testifying environmental consultant.
1
  The Court in rejecting 
the claim of privilege held that “[t]o the extent that any privilege 
or immunity from disclosure would otherwise apply to some or 
all of the discovery sought by Chevron pursuant to its 
Application, any such privilege has been waived and/or does not 
apply pursuant to the crime-fraud exception[.]”2  App. at 3.   
 
 We now hold that the District Court applied the 
appropriate standards in considering Chevron‟s section 1782 
application and correctly determined that the provision of 
documents to an Ecuadorian court-appointed expert to assess 
                                                 
1 Sometimes we use the terms appellants and UBR 
interchangeably inasmuch as both the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and 
UBR are appellants and the Ecuadorian plaintiffs engaged UBR. 
 
2 The order listed the documents, materials, information, and 
communications to which the crime-fraud exception had been 
waived or did not apply. 
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damages  resulted in a waiver of any work-product protections 
and attorney-client privileges that might otherwise have 
precluded discovery of those documents.  We limit our opinion, 
however, because we also hold that the District Court‟s ruling 
that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege 
was applicable, to the extent that the privilege was not waived, 
was too sweeping and has the potential to pierce the attorney-
client privilege for documents that were not created or used in 
furtherance of the alleged fraud and thus are not subject to 
disclosure through the application of the exception.  We 
therefore will vacate the District Court‟s determination with 
respect to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client 
privilege and will remand the case to the District Court so that it 
can conduct an in camera review of the relevant documents and 
determine whether the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-






 It is helpful in this case, arising out of 17 years of still 
ongoing litigation spanning across two continents, to provide 
background information to place this case in its proper 
perspective.  In 1993, certain communities in the Amazon River 
area of Ecuador
3
 (the Ecuadorian plaintiffs) filed a class action 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
                                                 
3 Some of the plaintiffs were Peruvian but we do not further 
discuss their position in the case as the parties do not focus on 
them on this appeal. 
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New York against Texaco, Inc. (Texaco), claiming that its 
subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum Company (TexPet), had caused 
massive environmental contamination and degradation in 
Ecuador that sickened and killed numerous persons in the 
Amazon River area.  See generally Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 
F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).  Texaco, and later Chevron after 
Texaco and Chevron partially merged in 2001, sought a 
dismissal of the suit on the basis of their claim of forum non 
conveniens and principles of international comity, contending 
that the Ecuadorian courts provided a more appropriate forum 
for the litigation.  In advancing their forum non conveniens 
argument, Texaco, and then Chevron, contended that the 
Ecuadorian courts offered a fair and adequate forum for the 
litigation and the Ecuadorian judiciary was impartial and free 
from corruption.  Id. at 474-80.  After protracted litigation 
which resulted in the rendering of several opinions by the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the District Court dismissed the action on the grounds of 
forum non conveniens and the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court‟s dismissal of the case.  The Courts conditioned 
the dismissal, however, on Chevron‟s agreement to consent to 
the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian courts and to waive any 
statute of limitations defenses that it might have if the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs refiled the case in Ecuador.   
 
 Promptly after the dismissal, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
refiled the case in a court in Lago Agrio, Ecuador, against 
Chevron (the Lago Agrio litigation).
4
  Though a trial began that 
                                                 
4 Chevron asserts that when the Ecuadorian plaintiffs filed the 
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year in the Lago Agrio litigation, the case still is pending in the 
Lago Agrio Court.
5
  It is an understatement to characterize the 
Lago Agrio litigation as contentious, as both sides of the 
litigation vigorously have opposed nearly every move by the 
other, and have accused the other side of criminal or fraudulent 
conduct in the course of the litigation.
6
   Appellants represent 
                                                                                                             
Lago Agrio litigation they did not simply refile the earlier action 
from the Southern District of New York, apparently because the 
parties in the two cases are not identical.  We have no need to 
discuss that point further. 
 
5 It is our understanding that the Ecuadorian courts conduct 
trials, or at least have conducted the trial in this case, by the 
examination of written submissions. 
 
6 Indeed, two of Chevron‟s attorneys face criminal prosecution 
in Ecuador arising out of the Lago Agrio litigation.  Chevron 
believes that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs or their attorneys were 
responsible for those prosecutions.  Moreover, appellants note 
that a court-appointed global damages expert filed an official 
complaint with the Lago Agrio Court asserting that individuals 
associated with Chevron were interfering with his work and 
threatening him and his team, and that the court responded to 
this complaint by providing the expert with law enforcement 
protection when he was conducting field work.  For its part, 
Chevron claims that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs perpetrated a 
fraud on the Lago Agrio Court by illegally and surreptitiously 
colluding with the supposedly independent global damages 
expert that the Lago Agrio Court appointed and by essentially 
ghost-writing his report for him. 
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that the Lago Agrio litigation has generated a massive record 
containing “more than 200,000 pages of evidence, roughly 
63,000 chemical sampling results produced by laboratories 
contracted by both parties and the court experts, testimony from 
dozens of witnesses, and dozens of judicial field inspections of 
former Chevron wells and production sites conducted over a 
five-year period under the oversight of the Lago Agrio court.”  
Appellants‟ br. at 9. 
 
 Early in the Lago Agrio litigation, both sides employed 
experts who submitted reports concerning the contamination at 
former TexPet well sites.  In October 2003, the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs petitioned the Lago Agrio Court to appoint an expert 
to conduct a global damages assessment of the contamination 
that TexPet allegedly caused.  At that time Chevron did not file 
a similar petition, but in 2007 it petitioned for appointment of a 
global damages assessment expert, a request that the court 
denied as untimely.  Consequently, the Lago Agrio Court 
determined that it would appoint a single global damages expert, 
with the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and Chevron each nominating a 
candidate for the position.  Ultimately, however, the Lago Agrio 
Court did not appoint either candidate and instead appointed 
Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega (Cabrera), an Ecuadorian 
environmental engineer and geologist who had served as a 
court-appointed expert earlier in the case, as the global damages 
expert.  Although the Lago Agrio Court appointed Cabrera, it 
ordered the Ecuadorian plaintiffs to pay his fees because they 
had requested the appointment of such an expert. 
 
 Cabrera accepted the appointment, and he and his team 
conducted numerous field inspections of the contamination sites, 
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with the parties being given notice of the date and location of 
those inspections and being allowed to participate in the 
inspection process.  Moreover, Cabrera, from time to time, 
requested that the parties submit materials to him.  In response 
to Cabrera‟s requests, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs submitted 
documents to him in support of their claims, but Chevron did 
not submit any documentation in support of its position to him.  
The process of this document submission has given rise to one 
of the primary issues in dispute between the parties because they 
are at odds on the question of whether they were permitted to 
submit documents on an ex parte basis to Cabrera for his 
consideration in drafting his report.  Indeed, Chevron regards 
the suggestion that the Lago Agrio Court permitted the 
submission of documents on an ex parte basis as “absurd.”  
Appellee‟s br. at 17.  On the other hand, the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs contend that the submissions were authorized and that 
the Lago Agrio Court actually “encouraged” the parties to 
provide documents in support of their positions to Cabrera.  
Appellants‟ br. at 44.  
 
 Cabrera‟s final assessment calculated the global damages 
at $27.3 billion.  Chevron reacted to that assessment by filing a 
motion with the Lago Agrio Court seeking to have it strike the 
global damages assessment from evidence and declare that 
Cabrera‟s appointment as global damages assessment expert was 
null and void.  Though the Lago Agrio Court did not give 
Chevron the relief it sought when it filed its motion, the court 
indicated that it understood that Chevron was dissatisfied with 
Cabrera and his final report, and reiterated that “the court is not 
  10 
required to abide by the opinion of the experts.”7  Appellee‟s 
Request for Judicial Notice at ex. 7.
8
  The court then, in what it 
explained was an effort to “receive further enlightenment and 
illustration and additional elements for judgment,” provided the 
parties with an additional 45 days to make new damages 
submissions for it to consider in reaching its judgment.  Id.  
 
 Chevron‟s responses to what it plainly regarded as 
unpalatable proceedings in Ecuador did not stop with it taking 
steps in that country, as it obviously, and ironically in view of its 
contentions on its forum non conveniens application that 
resulted in the dismissal of the Southern District of New York 
litigation, had lost faith in the Ecuadorian courts.  Thus, in an 
out-of-Ecuador response, Chevron filed a notice of arbitration 
under the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) pursuant to the United States-Ecuador 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) on November 23, 2009, 
                                                 
7 Apparently, under Ecuadorian law, the presiding judge will 
not be permitted to rule on the objections to the global damages 
assessment report Cabrera prepared until the judge issues the 
final judgment in the case. 
 
8 Even though, as we explain below, we deny the parties‟ 
motions to supplement the record on appeal, we are considering 
the Lago Agrio Court‟s response to Chevron‟s motion because 
of the significance of the response in the context of this section 
1782 application and because the court filed the response on 
August 2, 2010, a date after the District Court rendered its ruling 
on June 15, 2010. 
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challenging the Ecuadorian proceedings in an attempt to obtain 
an award that would preclude international recognition of the 
judgment that the Lago Agrio Court will enter in the Lago Agrio 
litigation.
9
  The parties to the arbitration proceeding are Chevron 
and the Republic of Ecuador, but not the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
even though they have an interest in the outcome of the 
arbitration.  Chevron asserts that it is entitled to the relief it 
seeks because it believes that the Ecuadorian government has 
conspired with the Ecuadorian plaintiffs to influence the 
outcome of the Lago Agrio litigation.
10
 
                                                 
9 According to appellants, Chevron has asked the BIT 
arbitration panel to tell the Ecuadorian government to direct the 
judge in the Lago Agrio litigation to dismiss the case but 
Chevron denies that it has asked for such relief and asserts, as 
we have pointed out, that it seeks an outcome precluding 
enforcement of a judgment entered in the Lago Agrio Court 
outside of Ecuador. 
 
10 Both the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and the Republic of Ecuador 
filed suits in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York seeking to obtain an order staying the BIT 
arbitration.  In those actions the plaintiffs contended that 
Chevron should be precluded from challenging the fairness of 
the Ecuadorian court system inasmuch as  Texaco argued so 
vehemently when pressing its forum non conveniens motion that 
the case should be venued in Ecuador in part because the courts 
in that country were fair and impartial.  The District Court in the 
Southern District of New York has declined to stay the BIT 
arbitration, but the parties seeking that relief have appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and 
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 In addition to having instituted the BIT arbitration in 
reaction to the Ecuadorian proceedings, Chevron has brought an 
extraordinary series of at least 25 requests to obtain discovery 
from at least 30 different parties pursuant to section 1782 in 
United States District Courts throughout the United States.   
These requests, which include the proceedings before us now, 
seek evidence to support Chevron‟s claim that the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs committed fraud in the prosecution of the Lago Agrio 
litigation.  Chevron‟s overarching contention in seeking the 
section 1782 discovery is that the judicial process in Ecuador is 
corrupt and that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and their associates 
have fraudulently conspired with Cabrera to produce a skewed 
damages report that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs ghost-wrote.  
Chevron seeks to use the discovery it obtains pursuant to its 
section 1782 requests in the Lago Agrio litigation and the BIT 
arbitration to support this contention.   
 
 In the section 1782 case now before us, Chevron filed its 
suit in the District of New Jersey, contending that UBR, the 
New Jersey-based environmental consulting firm that the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs engaged, employed Juan Cristóbal Villao 
Yepez (Villao), one of the 14 technical experts participating in 
the preparation of Cabrera‟s global damages report.  Chevron 
contends that the appearance of materials in Cabrera‟s final 
global damages assessment report with UBR‟s logo 
demonstrates that Cabrera‟s report was not impartial and that 
Cabrera improperly conspired with the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and 
                                                                                                             
that appeal currently is pending.  Apparently the BIT arbitration 
panel has not yet decided whether it has jurisdiction to entertain 
the arbitration proceeding. 
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UBR in drafting his report.   
 
 Appellants, on the other hand, express no surprise that 
Cabrera‟s report incorporates documents that they provided to 
him, including documents that UBR prepared, for they maintain 
that, as we pointed out above, the Lago Agrio Court sanctioned 
their providing Cabrera with the documents.  Appellants further 
contend that Cabrera was free to accept or reject the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs‟ submissions and consequently was free to incorporate 
the submissions into his report so long as he found them to be 
credible.  Nevertheless, in light of Villao‟s dual employment and 
the presence of materials from UBR in Cabrera‟s report, 
Chevron urges that it is entitled to an order under section 1782 
compelling UBR and Villao to turn over any documents 
transmitted between UBR and Cabrera, between Villao and 
Cabrera, and between counsel for the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and 
Villao.  Chevron‟s application led to the proceedings in the 
District Court and thus has led to this appeal. 
 
 The District Court heard oral argument on Chevron‟s 
application on June 11, 2010, and issued a decision from the 
bench on that day granting Chevron‟s section 1782 discovery 
request as to UBR.
11
  The Court then entered an order on June 
15, 2010, requiring UBR to produce documents transmitted 
                                                 
11 Because section 1782 only applies to a person who “resides” 
in the district of the District Court and Villao lives in Ecuador, 
the District Court dismissed Chevron‟s request to the extent that 
it related to Villao but did so “without prejudice to Chevron‟s 
right to later establish that he is found in the district.”  App. at 2. 
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between UBR and Cabrera, and, so far as UBR possessed them, 
any documents transmitted between Villao and Cabrera or 
Villao and the attorneys for the Ecuadorian plaintiffs or their 
representatives.  The order also permitted Chevron to cause a 
subpoena to be served in furtherance of the discovery.  We 
reiterate that the District Court rejected appellants‟ claims that 
the documents that Chevron requested were privileged by 
reasoning that “[t]o the extent that any privilege or immunity 
from disclosure would otherwise apply to some or all of the 
discovery sought by Chevron pursuant to its Application, any 
such privilege has been waived and/or does not apply pursuant 
to the crime-fraud exception[.]”  App. at 3.  The Court directed 
UBR to produce a list of all of the documents that appellants 
believed were privileged and thus were not subject to disclosure, 
so that the Court could review the list and reach its own 





 Following the District Court‟s issuance of its order on 
June 15, 2010, appellants appealed to this Court and 
simultaneously filed a motion for a stay pending appeal.  The 
District Court denied appellants‟ application for a stay pending 
appeal, but issued a temporary stay pending appellants‟ 
                                                 
12 It would seem to have been inconsistent for the District Court 
both to rule that the attorney-client privilege had been waived or 
did not apply because of the crime-fraud exception and yet to 
direct UBR to produce a list of communications that appellants 
believed were privileged for the Court‟s review.  Nevertheless, 
in view of our outcome we need not address this point further. 
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application for a stay to this Court.  We subsequently granted 
appellants a stay pending appeal on July 6, 2010, and also 
ordered that the appeal be expedited.
13
    
 
 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1782 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
 We review the District Court‟s decision on the section 
1782 discovery request for an abuse of discretion.  See In re 
Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1998).  However, if “the 
district court misinterpreted or misapplied the law,” or if “the 
court relied on inappropriate factors in the exercise of its 
discretion, our review is plenary.”  Id.  We review the District 
Court‟s ruling regarding waiver of the work product privilege 
for an abuse of discretion.  In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 
F.3d 978, 980-81 (3d Cir. 1998).  Finally, we review the legal 
issues underlying the District Court‟s application of the crime-
                                                 
13 The parties have moved on several occasions to supplement 
the record on appeal and we now deny those motions except that 
we have taken judicial notice of one proceeding in the Lago 
Agrio Court that was not in the original record in the District 
Court as it took place after the District Court decided this case 
and the proceeding is quite significant.  Our denial of the 
motions to supplement the record has not affected the outcome 
of this appeal as most of the evidence with which the parties 
seek to supplement the record is related only tangentially to the 
issues on this appeal.   
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fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege de novo, and its 
factual determinations for clear error.  In re Impounded, 241 





 Appellants first claim that Chevron‟s discovery request 
was not proper under section 1782 because Chevron sought 
discovery not intended “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or 
international tribunal.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).  Appellants 
argue that as a matter of statutory interpretation “[d]iscovery is 
not „for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal‟ where its 
purpose is to attack the tribunal itself.”  Appellants‟ br. at 22 
(emphasis in original).  The initial problem with appellants‟ 
contention is that Chevron intends to use the evidence that it 
uncovers in an attempt to show the Lago Agrio Court that the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs have engaged in fraud in the proceedings 
before that court.  Furthermore, use of the evidence uncovered 
in a section 1782 application in the BIT arbitration to “attack” 
the Lago Agrio Court unquestionably would be “for a use in a 
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”  The 
possibility that the evidence may be utilized to cast doubts on 
the impartiality of the Lago Agrio Court does not mean that 
Chevron‟s request for the evidence runs afoul of section 1782 
and that Chevron therefore may not obtain the evidence. 
 
 Appellants next contend that the District Court abused its 
discretion when it granted Chevron‟s section 1782 discovery 
request.  The seminal case exploring the parameters of section 
1782 is Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 
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241, 124 S.Ct. 2466 (2004), in which the Supreme Court 
explained that section 1782 “is the product of congressional 
efforts, over the span of nearly 150 years, to provide federal-
court assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign 
tribunals.”  Id. at 247, 124 S.Ct. at 2473.  In Intel, the Court 
rejected the “suggestion that a § 1782(a) applicant must show 
that United States law would allow discovery in domestic 
litigation analogous to the foreign proceeding.”  Id. at 263, 124 
S.Ct. at 2482.  The Court also held that section 1782 does not 
contain a “threshold requirement that evidence sought from a 
federal district court would be discoverable under the law 
governing the foreign proceeding.”  Id. at 247, 124 S.Ct. at 
2473.  The Court reasoned that “[b]eyond shielding material 
safeguarded by an applicable privilege . . . nothing in the text of 
§ 1782 limits a district court‟s production-order authority . . . .”  
Id. at 260, 124 S.Ct. at 2480.   
 
 The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that “comity and 
parity concerns may be important as touchstones for a district 
court‟s exercise of discretion in particular cases[.]”  Id. at 261, 
124 S.Ct. at 2481.  To that end, the Court discussed factors that 
a district court should consider when ruling on a section 1782(a) 
request: 
 
First, when a person from whom discovery is 
sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding . . 
. , the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as 
apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is 
sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising 
abroad.  A foreign tribunal has jurisdiction over 
those appearing before it, and can itself order 
  18 
them to produce the evidence. . . . 
. . . 
 
 Second, as the 1964 Senate Report 
suggests, a court presented with a § 1782(a) 
request may take into account the nature of the 
foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings 
underway abroad, and the receptivity of the 
foreign government or the court or agency abroad 
to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance. . . .  
Specifically, a district court could consider 
whether the § 1782(a) request conceals an attempt 
to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions 
or other policies of a foreign country or the 
United States. . . .  Also, unduly intrusive or 
burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed. 
 
Id. at 264-65, 124 S.Ct. at 2483 (citations omitted).  Inasmuch as 
relevant evidence is presumptively discoverable, “[t]he party 
opposing discovery [under section 1782(a)] has the „burden of 
demonstrating offense to the foreign jurisdiction, or any other 
facts warranting the denial of a particular application.‟”  Bayer 
AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d at 196). 
 
 The first Intel factor favors allowing Chevron to obtain 
the discovery it seeks because UBR is not a participant in the 
Lago Agrio litigation and, so far as we can determine from the 
record before us, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Lago 
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Agrio Court.
14
  Moreover, though we are aware that appellants 
argue that the documents transmitted to Cabrera are within the 
jurisdictional reach of the Lago Agrio Court, we have no basis 
to question the District Court‟s observation or its conclusion that 
followed at the hearing on Chevron‟s application that “Cabrera 
has apparently indicated that he has not been in receipt of any 
documents from UBR,” and for that reason “directing Mr. 
Cabrera to produce documents which he says he did not have 
would be pointless and fruitless as an exercise by the 
Ecuadorian court.”  App. at 50.  Additionally, though we cannot 
come to a conclusive determination on the issue, it is 
questionable whether the jurisdictional reach of the BIT arbitral 
panel embraces either UBR or Cabrera, which, after all, are not 
parties to the arbitration proceeding, so that the panel may 
compel them to produce documents.  In this regard, we note that, 
according to the District Court, the arbitration panel “does not 
have the authority to order such a production,”  and so those 
documents “would not be obtainable for use in the [BIT] 
arbitration absent discovery under Section 1782(a).”  Id. at 50-
51. 
 
 Appellants claim, with respect to the second Intel factor, 
that the Lago Agrio Court is not receptive to the documents 
Chevron is seeking in its section 1782 request.  We regard this 
                                                 
14 We see nothing in the briefs advancing arguments similar to 
the contention advanced in countless cases in courts in the 
United States, that an entity foreign to the forum, by its conduct 
that had consequences within the governmental jurisdiction of 
the forum court, became subject to the jurisdiction of that 
government‟s courts. 
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claim as naked because appellants do not present adequate 
evidence to support this contention and, as they are the parties 
opposing discovery under section 1782, they bear the “burden of 
demonstrating offense to the foreign jurisdiction.”  Bayer AG, 
173 F.3d at 190 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
We recognize that, according to appellants, the Lago Agrio 
Court has denied Chevron‟s requests for many of these same 
documents, and we are aware of their argument that the denial 
indicates that the Lago Agrio Court would not be receptive to 
Chevron obtaining the documents in the Lago Agrio litigation.  
But in our consideration of appellants‟ argument regarding the 
Lago Agrio Court‟s position with respect to the receipt of the 
documents, we also take into account Chevron‟s contention that 
the Lago Agrio Court has not denied Chevron‟s requests for the 
documents.  Overall, the status of Chevron‟s requests is not 
clear from the record.   
 
 In any event, regardless of the Lago Agrio Court‟s 
disposition of Chevron‟s request for the documents, it is plain 
that appellants‟ argument conflates the question of whether a 
foreign court would allow analogous discovery leading to the 
production of documents with the question of whether that court 
would consider evidence revealed in a section 1782 proceeding. 
 We have no reason to believe that the answers to those two 
questions necessarily are in harmony inasmuch as a court might 
offer limited discovery opportunities yet accept relevant 
evidence tendered to it if procured without its assistance.  
Furthermore, appellants‟ argument overlooks the circumstance 
that Chevron seeks the section 1782 discovery for use in both 
the Lago Agrio litigation and the BIT arbitration.  In this regard, 
we point out that while appellants suggest that the BIT arbitral 
  21 
panel would not be receptive to the evidence, so far as we can 
ascertain they base this suggestion on pure speculation.  In these 
circumstances, appellants‟ argument is insufficient given that 
they bear the burden of proof on the receptiveness issue as they 
are the parties opposing discovery under section 1782. 
 
 Appellants also contend that, under the third Intel factor, 
Chevron‟s section 1782 discovery request is nothing more than a 
concealed attempt to circumvent Ecuadorian proof-gathering 
restrictions or other Ecuadorian policies.  Again, appellants base 
their argument on the proposition that the Lago Agrio Court has 
denied Chevron‟s requests for these same documents, but, as we 
have discussed already, the parties disagree about the status of 
Chevron‟s requests to the Lago Agrio Court and we are 
uncertain as to that status.  Without a definitive determination 
that the Lago Agrio Court has denied Chevron access to the 
same documents that Chevron seeks in its section 1782 
discovery application, an issue on which appellants bear the 
burden of proof as the parties opposing discovery, it cannot be 
said that Chevron‟s section 1782 application is “an attempt to 
circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions.”  Intel, 542 U.S. 
at 265, 124 S.Ct. at 2483.  Moreover, as we indicated above, the 
Lago Agrio Court might be receptive to section 1782 evidence 
and, if so, regardless of that court‟s rulings on Chevron‟s request 
for documents, it would be a stretch to conclude that the section 
1782 proceeding was an attempt to circumvent Ecuadorian 
restrictions that somehow was offensive to the Lago Agrio 
Court. 
 
 We also point out that, as the Court made clear in Intel, 
there is no requirement that the material be discoverable in the 
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foreign country for it to be discoverable pursuant to a section 
1782 request in the United States.  See id. at 247, 124 S.Ct. at 
2473.  Moreover, appellants‟ argument once again minimizes 
the fact that Chevron‟s section 1782 discovery request seeks the 
documents for use in the BIT arbitration.  Furthermore, we have 
no basis on which we could hold that the section 1782 request is 
an attempt to circumvent proof-gathering restrictions or other 
policies of the BIT arbitral panel.  Overall, we are satisfied that 
none of the first three Intel factors caution against discovery.   
 
 Finally, in our consideration of Intel, we find no evidence 
that Chevron‟s section 1782 discovery request is “unduly 
intrusive or burdensome.”  See id. at 265, 124 S.Ct. at 2483.  We 
therefore conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in applying the Intel factors in considering Chevron‟s 
request in this case. 
 
 In addition to the factors that the Supreme Court 
elucidated in Intel to establish when, as a positive matter, a court 
could grant a section 1782 application, section 1782 provides 
that “[a] person may not be compelled to give his testimony or 
statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of 
any legally applicable privilege.”15  Appellants maintain that the 
District Court erred in its rulings relating to various evidentiary 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that section 1782(a), when providing for 
protection of documents shielded by “any legally applicable 
privilege,” does not limit the protected documents to those of 
which the respondent in the section 1782 proceedings is the 
holder of the privilege. 
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privileges.
16
  To start with, appellants assert that both the work-
product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege shield the 
documents from discovery.  They then contend that the District 
Court improperly concluded that the disclosure of the documents 
to a third-party waived that shield.  Appellants also contend that 
the Court improperly concluded that, to the extent that the 
attorney-client privilege was not waived, application of the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege trumps the 
protection of the privilege.
17
  Of course, if a privilege applied, 
then the Court should not have ordered UBR to produce the 
documents even though they were otherwise within the scope of 
disclosure that the Court could order when considering 
Chevron‟s section 1782 application.18 
 
                                                 
16 Appellants advance the contention that the District Court 
erred in failing to apply Ecuadorian privilege law.  We, 
however, need not address that contention because even if we 
assume that privileges under Ecuadorian law should be 
considered in adjudicating Chevron‟s section 1782 application, 
appellants have not presented any reliable or credible evidence 
that there is a privilege under Ecuadorian law that would 
preclude the discovery sought here. 
 
17 We agree with the District Court that the non-testifying 
expert privilege, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), is not applicable 
here because, “[b]y providing consulting expert reports to a 
testifying expert, the privilege is lost.”  App. at 47. 
 
18 The order may include documents as to which appellants do 
not claim a privilege. 
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 Though they both operate to protect information from 
discovery, the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client 
privilege serve different purposes.  The purpose behind the 
attorney-client privilege is “„to encourage clients to make full 
disclosure of facts to counsel so that he may properly, 
competently, and ethically carry out his representation.  The 
ultimate aim is to promote the proper administration of justice.‟” 
 In re Impounded, 241 F.3d at 316 (quoting In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979)).  The work-
product doctrine, by contrast, “promotes the adversary system 
directly by protecting the confidentiality of papers prepared by 
or on behalf of attorneys in anticipation of litigation.  Protecting 
attorneys‟ work product promotes the adversary system by 
enabling attorneys to prepare cases without fear that their work 
product will be used against their clients.”  Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citations omitted).   
 
 Though evidentiary privileges have important purposes, 
their recognition may result in the withholding of relevant 
information and so may obstruct the search for truth.  Indeed, 
the protections are effective only if they shield evidence and 
thus they necessarily obstruct the search for the truth at a trial at 
which they are recognized either implicitly or explicitly.  
Consequently, privileges should be recognized only when 
necessary to achieve their respective purposes.  See Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1577 (1976).  
The courts, in recognition of the purposes of the work-product 
doctrine and the attorney-client privilege, hold that purposeful 
disclosure of the purportedly privileged material to a third-party, 
if that disclosure undermines the purpose behind each privilege, 
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may waive both protections.  Thus, the courts recognize that 
because the attorney-client privilege serves to protect the 
confidentiality of communications between clients and their 
attorneys, “disclosure to a third party waives the attorney-client 
privilege unless the disclosure is necessary to further the goal of 
enabling the client to seek informed legal assistance.”  
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1428.   
 
 On the other hand, the work-product doctrine protects an 
attorney‟s work from falling into the hands of an adversary, and 
so “disclosure to a third party does not necessarily waive the 
protection of the work-product doctrine.”  Id.  Rather, the 
purpose behind the work-product doctrine “requires [a court] to 
distinguish between disclosures to adversaries and disclosures to 
non-adversaries[,]” id., and it is only in cases in which the 
material is disclosed in a manner inconsistent with keeping it 
from an adversary that the work-product doctrine is waived.  See 
id.   
 
 Appellants argue that work-product and attorney-client 
protections should apply in this case and UBR‟s submission of 
documents to Cabrera did not waive the protections.  In 
furtherance of this argument, appellants contend that the 
submission of documents to Cabrera was not inconsistent with 
the holders of the privileges having the intention of keeping the 
materials from Chevron.  Appellants predicate this argument on 
their contention that the parties to the Lago Agrio litigation 
could submit documents to Cabrera on an ex parte basis, with 
the understanding that the documents would remain 
confidential.  We find that argument to be at odds with the 
record inasmuch as the lead attorney for the Ecuadorian 
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plaintiffs acknowledged in an affidavit that “to the extent that 
Mr. Cabrera put into his report any of the information that I 
supplied to him, it would be viewable by Chevron or any other 
member of the public that viewed Mr. Cabrera‟s report.”  App. 
at 1453.   
 
 In fact, even if we disregarded the attorney‟s affidavit, 
something we will not do, we can discern no reason for 
appellants‟ submission of the documents to Cabrera other than 
for him to consider those documents to advance appellants‟ hope 
that Cabrera‟s final global damages assessment report would 
reflect the materials and conclusions in the documents.  Indeed, 
it is quite clear that appellants intended that by submitting the 
documents to Cabrera they would place him in a position to 
serve as a conduit to transmit the documents to Chevron because 
they hoped that Cabrera would agree with the documents‟ 
assessment of damages and thus would incorporate the 
documents, or at least the conclusions in them, into his report.  
Consequently, we are satisfied that the documents were 
submitted to Cabrera in a manner inconsistent with keeping 
them from Chevron, and therefore the work-product doctrine 
and the attorney-client privilege were waived as to the 
documents submitted to Cabrera.  We therefore will affirm the 
District Court‟s order that all materials transmitted from UBR to 
Cabrera are subject to discovery notwithstanding any claim of 
work-product or attorney-client privilege protections. 
 
 The District Court also ruled that the crime-fraud 
exception operated to pierce the attorney-client privilege for all 
communications between Villao and Cabrera and between 
Villao and anyone affiliated with counsel for the Ecuadorian 
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plaintiffs.  As we have discussed, the attorney-client privilege 
promotes the attorney-client relationship and, in turn, furthers 
the administration of justice by protecting communications 
between attorneys and their clients.  See In re Impounded, 241 
F.3d at 316.  That purpose “would be frustrated if the client used 
the lawyer‟s services to further a continuing or future crime or 
tort.”  Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 
802) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, in situations 
where the client consults the attorney for the purpose of 
committing a future crime or fraud, the crime-fraud exception to 
the attorney-client privilege applies and communications made 
in furtherance of the anticipated crime or fraud are not protected 
from disclosure as recognition of  “the privilege is no longer 
defensible.”  Id. at 317 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
604 F.2d at 802) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 2626 
(1989) (“It is the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege to assure that the seal of secrecy 
between lawyer and client does not extend to communications 
made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a 
fraud or crime.” (Internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).          
 
 A party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception to 
the attorney-client privilege bears the burden of demonstrating 
that the exception is applicable.  In re: Grand Jury Investigation, 
445 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2006).  Specifically, before the 
crime-fraud exception can be invoked successfully, the party 
contending that it applies 
 
must make a prima facie showing that (1) the 
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client was committing or intending to commit a 
fraud or crime, and (2) the attorney-client 
communications were in furtherance of that 
alleged crime or fraud.  A prima facie showing 
requires presentation of evidence which, if 
believed by the fact-finder, would be sufficient to 
support a finding that the elements of the crime-
fraud exception were met. 
 
Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 217 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 Appellants admit that UBR employed Villao when he 
was also an expert on Cabrera‟s staff.  Though we recognize that 
the Lago Agrio Court may view what seems to us to be a 
conflict of interest differently than we do, we believe that this 
showing of Villao‟s dual employment is sufficient to make a 
prima facie showing of a fraud that satisfies the first element of 
the showing necessary to apply the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege.  Thus, we agree with the District 
Court‟s conclusion that the first element of the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege applied on the basis of 
the alleged fraud predicated on the presence of the conflict of 
interest attributable to Villao‟s dual and, at least to us, 
inconsistent employment.   
 
 Yet evidence of a crime or fraud, no matter how 
compelling, does not by itself satisfy both elements of the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege because to 
establish the second element of the exception the party seeking 
to circumvent the privilege by invoking the exception bears the 
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burden of making a prima facie showing that there were 
communications between the client and attorney in furtherance 
of that fraud.  We believe that the evidence in the record is 
simply too sparse for us to conclude that Chevron has met that 
burden and thus, to date, Chevron has not made a sufficient 
prima facie showing that the second element of the showing that 
must be made to justify the application of the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege is present here.      
 
 However, even if the party seeking to invoke the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege cannot make out 
a prima facie case sufficient to overcome the privilege, it still 
may be entitled to have a court make an in camera review of the 
documents in issue to determine if those documents and the 
evidence placing the documents in context establish the 
applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.  See 
generally Zolin, 491 U.S. at 570-72, 109 S.Ct. at 2630-31 
(holding that in camera review of privileged documents to 
determine if those documents establish that crime-fraud 
exception applies is proper as long as party seeking to invoke 
crime-fraud exception makes threshold showing).  Because “in 
camera inspection . . . is a smaller intrusion upon the 
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship than is public 
disclosure[,]” it follows “that a lesser evidentiary showing is 
needed to trigger in camera review than is required ultimately to 
overcome the privilege.”  Id. at 572, 109 S.Ct. at 2630-31 
(quotation marks and citations omitted).  Thus, “[b]efore 
engaging in [an] in camera review to determine the applicability 
of the crime-fraud exception, the judge should require a showing 
of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a 
reasonable person . . . that in camera review of the materials 
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may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud 
exception applies.”  Id. at 572, 109 S.Ct. at 2631 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
 We are satisfied that Chevron has made “a showing of a 
factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a 
reasonable person . . . that in camera review of the materials 
may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud 
exception applies.”  See id.  Thus, although we will vacate the 
District Court‟s ruling to the extent that it determined that the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is 
applicable, our ruling is by no means the last word with respect 
to the applicability of the exception.  Quite to the contrary, we 
will remand the case to the District Court to conduct an in 
camera review of the documents in issue to determine whether 
they were created or used in furtherance of a fraud and thus 
whether the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client 
privilege is applicable to some or all of the documents the Court 
reviews.
19
    
                                                 
19 It is significant that appellants in their brief, though referring 
to the application of Ecuadorian privilege law (which we have 
found they have not sufficiently documented to demonstrate its 
applicability), have suggested the use of the same process that 
we find is applicable in an analysis of the crime-fraud exception 
as they write that “[a]ny such waiver must also be understood in 
light of a document by document analysis.”  Appellants‟ br. at 
19. 
 
 We do not suggest that in camera review is necessary in 
every case in which the crime-fraud exception is invoked, as a 
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 Finally we point out that, as we mentioned previously, the 
District Court dismissed Villao from this case because he is not 
within the District of New Jersey.  Thus, because we lack 
jurisdiction over Villao, any order relating to documents in his 
possession that requires that he produce them will be 
unenforceable; we only have jurisdiction over UBR and in these 
proceedings we can order only UBR to produce documents. As 
the District Court recognized, an order requiring disclosure of 
documents transmitted between Villao and Cabrera or Villao 
and any attorneys associated with the Ecuadorian plaintiffs is 
valid only as to UBR and thus includes only those documents in 





  To summarize, we will affirm the District Court‟s order 
of June 15, 2010, requiring UBR to turn over to Chevron 
documents that it submitted to Cabrera because the transmission 
of those documents to Cabrera waived any work-product 
protection and the attorney-client privilege with respect to those 
                                                                                                             
party may be able to satisfy both elements of the crime-fraud 
exception without resort to the privileged documents 
themselves.  We simply hold that in this case, based on the 
evidence before the District Court, Chevron has not met its 
burden regarding the second element of the crime-fraud 
exception, but has made the requisite showing necessary for the 
District Court to conduct an in camera review of the documents 
in issue in order to determine if the second element of the crime-
fraud exception is satisfied here. 
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documents.  UBR should begin producing those documents 
immediately in accordance with the District Court‟s order and to 
the extent that our stay permitted UBR to delay producing those 
documents, we vacate it.    
 
 We also will vacate the District Court‟s ruling that the 
crime-fraud exception operates to pierce the attorney-client 
privilege for all communications between Villao and Cabrera 
and between Villao and anyone affiliated with counsel for the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs, and will remand the case to the District 
Court so that it may conduct an in camera review of the 
documents in issue.  Predicated on that review and on what 
other evidence is developed on the remand, the District Court 
should determine whether any of the documents and, if so, 
which ones, were created or used in furtherance of a fraud, as it 
is only as to documents created or used in furtherance of a fraud 
that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is 
applicable.  Finally, we express the hope that even though our 
remand requires the District Court to examine individual 
documents, a task that we recognize likely will be formidable, 
the parties will cooperate in applying the directions in this 
opinion to the documents to be examined so that the burden on 
the District Court to resolve disputes is lessened.  The parties 
will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
